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SIN, SALVATION, AND THE LAW OF CHARITIES 
Corwin R. Kruse† 
Governing Nonprofit Corporations: Federal and State Law and 
Regulation. By Marion R. Fremont-Smith. Belknap Press, 2004. 570 
pages, $95. 
 
 
Charity creates a multitude of sins. 
 
— Oscar Wilde1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has a larger collection of charitable 
organizations than any other nation in the world, and the number 
is growing quickly.2  In 1997, fully 5.8% of all of the legal entities in 
the United States were nonprofits.3  Unfortunately, the growth of 
the nonprofit4 sector is outstripping both the government and 
business sectors.5  Despite a doubling in charitable giving and a 
 
       † Clerk to the Honorable Jill Flaskamp Halbrooks, Minnesota Court of 
Appeals, 2004-05; J.D. 2004, magna cum laude, William Mitchell College of Law; 
B.A. 1986, Business Administration, University of South Dakota; B.S. 1989, 
Sociology, University of Iowa; M.A. 1995, Sociology, The Pennsylvania State 
University; Ph.D. candidate, Sociology, University of Minnesota. 
 1. OSCAR WILDE, THE SOUL OF MAN UNDER SOCIALISM AND SELECTED CRITICAL 
PROSE 128 (Penguin Books, 2001). 
 2. Stephanie Strom, Accountability; New Equation for Charities: More Money, Less 
Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17 2003, at F1. 
 3. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: 
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 7 (2004) [hereinafter GOVERNING]. 
 4. Despite the name, nonprofits are not actually prohibited from earning a 
profit; they are barred from distributing those profits to the organization’s 
directors, officers or members.  Excess revenues must either be saved or expended 
to further the goals of the organization.  Wendy K. Szymanski, An Allegory of Good 
(and Bad) Governance: Applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit Organizations, 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 1303, 1307 (2003). 
 5. Strom, supra note 2, at F1 (noting that the Internal Revenue Service has 
only 800 employees to monitor almost 1.6 million charities and other tax-exempt 
1
Kruse: Sin, Salvation, and the Law of Charities
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
KRUSE BKREV(LS & CB).DOC 10/3/2004  9:46:10 PM 
384 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
near doubling in the number of private foundations between 1992 
and 2002, “state and federal money spent monitoring them 
remained flat or declined.”6 
Charities are generally thought of as organizations that 
perform good works and serve public policy.7  This perspective has 
historical underpinnings and guides our legal view of such 
organizations to this day.8  Despite this public purpose, the 
nonprofit sector is often marked by a lack of accountability to the 
public.9  This is exacerbated by the fact that “[a] distinguishing 
feature of the nonprofit sector is the freedom within which its 
component entities are allowed to operate.”10 
Charitable organizations often fall short of the lofty ideals we 
ascribe to them.  Just as the for-profit sector has experienced its 
share of scandals in recent years, so too has the non-profit sector 
been tarnished by illicit activity.11  Between 1995 and 2002, “[h]igh-
level charity officials stole or misused at least $1.28-billion from 152 
nonprofit organizations . . . , but the organizations recovered less 
than half that amount while many perpetrators received minor 
punishment.”12  As substantial as these numbers are, they likely 
understate the problem.  The figures are based on newspaper 
accounts of charity fraud; because many of those accused of 
impropriety are not prosecuted, a substantial number of incidents 
probably never make the headlines.13 
 
organizations). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Obviously people have competing ideas about what constitutes a “good 
work” and what direction public policy should take.  Likewise, nonprofit 
organizations range across the socio-political spectrum.  Although any given 
organization reflects a particular view of public good, nonprofits, taken as a whole, 
may arguably be seen as pursuing public purposes and fulfilling societal needs, 
broadly defined. 
 8. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Greater Scrutiny for Nonprofits, 90 A.B.A. J. 51 
(June 2004) (noting the origins of nonprofits’ tax-exempt status in seventeenth-
century English common law). 
 9. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 
222. 
 10. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 1. 
 11. See Fishman, supra note 9, at 219 n.1 (providing examples of recent 
scandals involving nonprofit organizations). 
 12. Brad Wolverton, Study: Charity Fraud Exceeds $1-Billion, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 27, 2003, at 26. 
 13. Id. 
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THE LAW OF NONPROFITS 
Although Marion Fremont-Smith’s new book is entitled 
Governing Nonprofit Organizations, its focus is on that segment of the 
nonprofit sector described as “charitable.”  Charitable 
organizations form the principal part of the sector and are the 
organizations that are most closely aligned with the original focus 
of the law of nonprofits.14  They can be distinguished from other 
nonprofits, such as fraternal organizations, labor organizations, or 
credit unions, by virtue of their “public focus.”15 
Fremont-Smith begins by presenting a brief overview of the 
nonprofit sector in the twenty-first century.  She then embarks on a 
detailed and surprisingly interesting discussion of the history of the 
“law of charities.”  An early system of regulation arose in the 
ecclesiastical courts of medieval England.16 
During this period . . . charitable gifts acquired three 
distinct characteristics that still survive: (1) the privilege of 
indefinite existence; (2) the privilege of validity even if 
the gift is in general terms, so long as its objective is 
exclusively charitable; and (3) the privilege of obtaining 
fresh objects if those laid down by the founder become 
incapable of execution, known today as the doctrine of cy 
pres.17 
The starting point for the modern law of charities, however, is 
the Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601.18  The purpose of 
the statute was to encourage and organize “private almsgiving” by 
correcting abuses in the administration of charitable gifts and by 
listing a variety of specific “charitable purposes.”19 
This statute had a profound impact on the development of 
 
 14. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 3. Determining which organizations are 
properly defined as “charitable” is not always easy.  In popular terms, however, a 
charity may be thought of as an organization whose raison d’etre is some type of  
“public benefit.” See id. at 3-4. 
 15. Id. at 5. This distinction is, of course, of limited utility. Nonprofit 
organizations are generally considered to be those granted exemption from 
income tax by the Internal Revenue Service. Charitable organizations may thus be 
defined as those falling under section 501(c)(3) or, in some cases, section 
501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. See generally id. at 4-8 (discussing the 
various categories of nonprofits). 
 16. Id. at 22. We may trace this farther back still: the medieval English laws 
have their origins in Roman concepts of charities. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 28. This statute was also known as the Statute of Elizabeth. Id. 
 19. Id. at 29. 
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charitable organizations in both England and, later, the United 
States.20  It set the groundwork for the proliferation of charitable 
trusts in both nations, albeit not without some difficulty.  In 1819, 
the Supreme Court decided Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist 
Association v. Hart’s Executors21 and threw into doubt the very validity 
of charitable trusts.22  In Hart, Justice Marshall determined that “the 
law of charitable trusts had its origins in, and was based upon, the 
Statute of Charitable Uses in 1601, and that with the repeal of that 
statute by Virginia in 1792, any trust without beneficiaries who were 
definitely named was invalid.”23  The holding, however, was based 
on the erroneous impression that charitable trusts did not exist in 
England prior to the statute.24  They had, in fact, existed before this 
time; the statute simply increased their popularity.25  Although Hart 
was reversed twenty-five years later,26 it continued to influence the 
development of charitable trusts in a number of states, including 
Minnesota.27 
Although charitable trusts remained the primary form of 
charitable organization for many years, the rise of the corporate 
form in American business led to an ever-increasing use of that 
form for charitable purposes as well.28  Charitable corporations can 
be found in the (soon to be) United States as far back as 1756;29 
however, use of the corporate form really took off following World 
War II.30  Today, the nonprofit corporation is the predominant 
form of charitable organization in the United States.31 
The bulk of Fremont-Smith’s book is devoted to a lengthy 
discussion of the creation and regulation of charitable 
organizations in the United States.  Although other organizational 
forms are available, charities are usually created in the legal form of 
 
 20. Id. at 28-29. 
 21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819). 
 22. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 44-45. 
 23. Id. at 44. 
 24. Id. at 45. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Hart was reversed by Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 
(1844), in which the Court held that charitable trusts could be recognized in the 
United States regardless of statutes abolishing English laws.  Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 49-50. 
 29. See id. at 50 (discussing a corporate charter granted by the Massachusetts 
General Court to promote public education). 
 30. Id. at 52-53. 
 31. Id. at 116; Fishman, supra note 9, at 225. 
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either a corporation or a trust.32  The applicable legal standards 
vary substantially depending upon which organizational form is 
used.33 
Directors of all nonprofit organizations are fiduciaries.34  
Exactly what this fiduciary relationship entails, however, depends 
upon the organizational form of the nonprofit.35  Fiduciary 
responsibilities for directors of charitable trusts are governed by 
“restrictive and demanding” trust law principles.36  In contrast, 
regulation of charitable corporations is built on a “more lenient” 
foundation of business corporate law.37  As a result, the choice of 
organization entails a trade-off between the greater flexibility of the 
corporate form and the higher standard of care embodied in the 
trust.38 
“A distinguishing feature of charity regulation is that it is a 
dual system, with state and federal rules and enforcement programs 
that parallel each other to a large degree.”39  This has not always 
been the case; regulation of charities fell almost exclusively to the 
states until the enactment of federal tax laws in the early 1900s.40  
These laws marked the beginning of a dual system that persists to 
this day.41 
The primary responsibility for the oversight of charities rests 
with the states.42  “Charities are the creatures of the states, and the 
laws governing their establishment, their right to continuous 
existence, their freedom to operate, any limitations on the nature 
of their holdings, and the conditions for their dissolution have 
 
 32. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 116.  Among the other organizational forms 
available are voluntary associations and limited liability companies (LLCs).  Id. 
 33. Id. at 117. See also Fishman, supra note 9, at 222-27 (discussing the forms 
of organization and the varying legal standards that accompany them). 
 34. Fishman, supra note 9, at 227. 
 35. See generally GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 187-211 (discussing the distinct 
fiduciary duties of directors of charitable trusts and charitable corporations). 
 36. Fishman, supra note 9, at 225. 
 37. Id. The question of whether trust or corporate fiduciary standards should 
apply to directors of charitable corporations was not clearly answered until the 
latter half of the twentieth century.  Now, however, “the majority of states have 
opted to apply the more lenient [corporate] standards . . . .” GOVERNING, supra 
note 3, at 200. 
 38. See Fishman, supra note 9, at 225-26. 
 39. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 428. 
 40. Id. at 53-54. 
 41. Id. at 54. 
 42. Id. at 377. 
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been and continue to be determined at the state level.”43 
Within the states, enforcement of the fiduciary duties of the 
managers of charitable organizations is, with rare exceptions, left to 
the courts.44  In such a system, the attorneys general are charged 
almost exclusively with the enforcement of laws governing 
charitable trusts and corporations.45  This provides them with an 
enormous amount of potential power to wield over nonprofits. 
The range of court actions that an attorney general may 
request a court to take to enforce fiduciary duties is as 
broad as the power of the courts to devise remedies for 
breach of fiduciary duties. He may request accountings, 
removal of trustees, dissolution of corporations, forced 
transfer of corporate property, or a combination of these. 
He may ask the court to force charitable fiduciaries to 
restore losses caused by breach of duty and to return 
profits made in the course of administering the trust. He 
may seek to enjoin trustees from further wrongdoing or 
from continuing certain specific actions. Furthermore, 
transactions involving a breach of the duty of loyalty may 
be voided at the option of the attorney general unless he 
decides that it is in the public interest to affirm them. The 
attorney general, as well as trustees, may bring actions 
requesting modification or deviation from the terms of a 
trust or cy pres application of funds.46 
In most states, the enforcement powers of attorneys general 
have been enhanced in the years since World War II by a variety of 
regulations and reporting statutes.47  Minnesota is among the states 
to have adopted such a statute, enacting the Supervision of 
Charitable Trusts and Trustees Act48 in 1989.49  This Act requires 
charitable trusts and foundations to register with the attorney 
general’s office,50 provide copies of all tax information,51 and notify 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 301. Supervision of some aspects of administration of charities may 
be provided by agencies such as departments of health or education or secretaries 
of state. See id. at 364-70. 
 45. Id. at 301. 
 46. Id. at 309.  There are, of course, limits to this power.  See id. at 309-11. 
 47. See id. at 311-21.  A number of these were modeled after the Uniform Act 
for Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes.  Id. at 312-14. 
 48. MINN. STAT. §§ 501B.33-.45, codified by 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 340, art. 1, § 
25. 
 49. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 313.  Although the Act makes no reference to 
the Uniform Act, it contains similar provisions.  Id. 
 50. MINN. STAT. § 501B.37, subd. 2 (2003). 
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the attorney general of any court proceedings involving the 
organization.52  It also provides that all records will be open for 
public inspection53 and allows the attorney general to bring a civil 
suit against managers for breach of trust.54  Organizations formed 
as corporations are separately regulated under Chapters 30955 and 
317A56 of the Minnesota Statutes. 
Such power obviously carries with it the potential for misuse.  
Fremont-Smith notes two “disturbing trends” in state regulation of 
charities.57  The first is the use of the threat of litigation by 
attorneys general to force charities into settlements that are 
substantially more restrictive than required by law or likely to be 
imposed by courts.58  The second is the “politicization” of the 
regulation of charities by attorneys general.59 
The politicization of regulation has raised questions 
nationally.60  Of particular concern is the idea that attorneys 
general are becoming “headhunters,” using their regulatory power 
to replace board members with hand-picked successors.61  Although 
this is an issue in many states, “no other attorney general has drawn 
more attention for such appointments than Mike Hatch of 
Minnesota.”62  Proponents argue that such actions are nothing 
more than zealous guardianship of charitable assets. Opponents 
express concerns with the ethical dangers of attorneys general 
regulating their own appointees.63 
The primary federal source of regulation for nonprofits is the 
Internal Revenue Service.64  For many charities, assuring that they 
 
 51. MINN. STAT. § 501B.38, subd. 1 (2003). 
 52. MINN. STAT. § 501B.41, subd. 2 (2003). 
 53. MINN. STAT. § 501B.39 (2003). 
 54. MINN. STAT. § 501B.41, subd. 7 (2003). 
 55. MINN. STAT. §§ 309.50-.72 (2004) (regulating Social and Charitable 
Organizations). 
 56. MINN. STAT. §§ 317A.001-.909 (2004) (regulating Nonprofit 
Corporations). 
 57. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 446-47. 
 58. Id. at 446. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, Strong-Arm Shaking of Charities Raises Ethics 
Qualms, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at A22. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See generally id. 
 64. See generally GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 238-41 (providing an overview of 
Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which confers tax-exempt status on 
a variety of organizations such as religious organizations, child-care organizations 
and social welfare organizations). 
7
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will be exempt from federal taxes and eligible to receive tax-
deductible contributions is a major consideration.65  Most 
charitable organizations are granted exemption from taxes under 
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,66 but certain 
“social welfare organizations” are exempt under section 
501(c)(4).67 
Despite the importance of the IRS in regulating charities, this 
role was not foreseen when Congress first voted to grant tax 
exemptions to charitable organizations.68  “In fact, it is only since 
1969 that the Service became an effective regulator of fiduciary 
behavior and not until the end of the twentieth century that this 
power was extended to the vast majority of charitable fiduciaries.”69 
Current IRS regulation has a number of components.  The 
Service issues revenue rulings on points of law and revenue 
procedures that address the process for dealing with the IRS70  
They are legally binding on the Service, but are subject to court 
review.71  Information releases and notices issued by the Service 
likewise have the force of law.72  The IRS also issues private letter 
rulings, general counsel memos, and technical advice 
memoranda.73  Such determinations are “private” and therefore not 
precedential; however, they do provide legal guidance for 
organizations.74  Finally, the Internal Revenue Code allows for 
public disclosure of returns75 from exempt organizations.76  This 
allows for a certain level of public oversight of nonprofits.77 
As a last resort, tax matters may be litigated.  Litigation with 
respect to these matters is bifurcated in the federal system.78  With 
 
 65. See generally id. at 238-52 (explaining the basic requirements for obtaining 
and retaining tax-exempt status as well as the permitted purposes of tax-exempt 
charities). 
 66. Id. at 238. 
 67. Id. at 239. Unlike 501(c)(3) organizations, 501(c)(4) organizations are 
not barred from lobbying activities. They are, however, under the same 
prohibition against participation in elections.  Id. 
 68. Id. at 299-300. 
 69. Id. at 300. 
 70. Id. at 395. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 396. 
 73. Id. at 396-97. 
 74. Id. at 397. 
 75. The word “return” is broadly interpreted.  See id. 
 76. Id. at 397-98. 
 77. See id. at 398-400 (discussing Freedom of Information Act inquiries). 
 78. Id. at 400. 
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the exception of litigation in the Tax Court, all civil litigation 
arising under revenue laws is handled by the Justice Department’s 
Tax Division.79  Additionally, the Justice Department conducts 
criminal tax prosecutions.80 
There are also several other federal agencies that help regulate 
charities.  The FBI’s Economic Crimes Unit investigates allegations 
of fraud in telemarketing, federal government procurement, and 
federally funded programs.81  Although there is no charity-specific 
investigation classification, some of the organizations investigated 
are nonprofits.82  The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) works with charities in coordinating disaster relief 
operations.83  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces 
consumer protection laws, some of which cover solicitation of 
charitable contributions.84  The United States Postal Inspection 
Service combats mail fraud and has authority to investigate 
charitable solicitations conducted through the mails.85  Finally, the 
Office of Personnel Management “selects charities to which federal 
employees may make their charitable contributions through a 
coordinated appeal.”86 
The final chapter of Governing Nonprofits discusses recent 
modifications in the regulation of charities and assesses some 
proposals for future improvement.  Much of the discussion 
summarizes the previous chapters and points to the implications of 
the dual system of supervision. 
Prior to the 1970s, the state and federal regulatory regimes 
had differing aims and utilized divergent enforcement 
mechanisms.87  In contrast to the variety of sanctions available at 
the state level, enforcement by the IRS was limited to revoking an 
organization’s exemption.88  Such revocation often failed to remedy 
the problem because charitable assets were seized while 
wrongdoers went unpunished.89 
Federal options began to broaden with the passage of the Tax 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 423-24. 
 82. Id. at 424. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 424-25. 
 85. Id. at 425. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 429. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 429-30. 
9
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Reform Act of 1969, which allowed sanctions with respect to private 
foundations for self-dealing and to managers who knowingly 
approved the prohibited transactions.90  More recent changes have 
served to bring the state and federal systems closer together by 
aligning the fiduciary duties of the latter with the former.91  Under 
the new federal rules, sanctions available with respect to publicly 
supported charities are similar to those previously available in cases 
of private foundation self-dealing.92 
In the wake of a number of highly publicized corporate 
scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.93  
Although this Act was aimed at curbing problematic behavior in 
the for-profit sector, many of its provisions could be applied to the 
nonprofit sector as well.94  Connecticut has already considered a bill 
that would do just that,95 and it is likely that other states will follow 
suit.96  Even without legal reforms, however, “it can . . . be expected 
that there will be pressure on nonprofit institutions to borrow some 
of the principles of good governance espoused by the Act for their 
own purposes.”97 
Some commentators have proposed that better governance of 
nonprofits could be effected by moving federal regulation from the 
IRS to another existing or newly created agency or bureau.98  “The 
most often mentioned suggestion... has been to move it from the 
Service to a new independent body similar to the Charity 
Commission in England99 or to a separate division within . . . 
another federal agency.”100 
Fremont-Smith argues against such a change, noting that the 
number of organizations regulated by the Charity Commission is 
 
 90. Id. at 429. 
 91. Id. at 430. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.). 
 94. See, e.g., Szymanski, supra note 4 (discussing application of Sarbanes-Oxley 
to nonprofits); Tebo, supra note 8 (same). 
 95. Szymanki, supra note 4, at 1305.  Provisions applying such reforms to 
nonprofits were omitted from the final bill.  Id. 
 96. GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 431. 
 97. Szymanski, supra note 4, at 1305. 
 98. See GOVERNING, supra note 3, at 461-66 (discussing proposals to change 
the situs of federal regulation). 
 99. This commission, which has “broad regulatory as well as quasi-judicial 
powers over charitable fiduciaries[,]” has regulated charities in England for over a 
century.  Id. at 464. 
 100. Id. at 462. 
10
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far fewer than would fall under the auspices of a similar agency in 
the United States.101  In addition, because deductibility of 
contributions is much more limited under British law, the scale of 
oversight required is substantially less.102  Moreover, Fremont-Smith 
notes that changes in the structure of the IRS in the last thirty years 
have made it much more responsive to the needs of nonprofits and 
its record in resisting political pressures “has been unusually 
unblemished.”103  This, she says, “is an advantage that should not be 
lost.”104  While it is true that such an advantage should not be lost, 
establishment of a separate agency to govern nonprofits does not 
mean that it would be lost.  Fremont-Smith suggests as much, 
however, without explaining why this would occur. 
Fremont-Smith advocates, at minimum, two changes in 
nonprofit law.  First, and in her view the most important, would be 
“to remove the almost complete protection from liability given to 
fiduciaries in the latter part of the twentieth century.”105  Such a 
proposal would provide greater accountability.  The primary 
drawback may be an increased reluctance of individuals to take on 
positions of responsibility.  This could present an especially 
significant problem for smaller organizations that rely heavily on 
volunteer leadership because the possibility of lawsuits may 
discourage some from becoming involved.  Whether or not this 
would be a significant impediment for charities is difficult to judge. 
Fremont-Smith’s second proposal is to provide greater funding 
to regulatory agencies to allow them to more effectively carry out 
their enforcement duties.106  While certainly beneficial, whether 
such action would find support in the current fiscal environment 
remains to be seen. 
CONCLUSION 
Governing Nonprofits presents a detailed summary of the laws 
governing charitable organizations.  It is unlikely that attorneys 
experienced in the area of nonprofit law will find much new in this 
work.  Nonetheless, the book would prove useful for students or for 
practitioners who occasionally work with charities and desire an 
 
 101. Id. at 465. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 465-66. 
 104. Id. at 466. 
 105. Id. at 471. 
 106. Id. 
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overview of the legal landscape.  Fremont-Smith’s book is most 
valuable with respect to federal law.  Its utility regarding state law is 
more limited due to variations among multiple jurisdictions; 
however, the book does provide a synopsis of general trends. 
Particularly helpful in dealing with multi-jurisdictional issues is 
the appendix.  It contains several tables summarizing the laws of 
each state governing the creation, administration, and dissolution 
of charities; the standards for applicability of the cy pres doctrine in 
each jurisdiction; and the fiduciary duties required in each state.  
These tables provide a handy roadmap to the applicable sections in 
each state’s statutes. 
My primary criticism of Governing Nonprofits relates to Fremont-
Smith’s discussion of proposed improvements to laws governing 
charities.  I would have preferred a more detailed assessment and 
analysis regarding various suggestions.  After the detailed history 
and analysis of current state and federal law, the discussion of 
proposals for future reforms seemed incomplete. 
Such criticism aside, Governing Nonprofits provides a functional 
general reference to the law of charities.  Students and 
practitioners looking for an introduction to this area may find it a 
useful addition to their bookshelves. 
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